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a proposed draft for the complete revision of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.
KEYWORDS: advertising, specialization, rules
Advertising, Solicitation, And Indication Of
Specialization: Recent Proposed Rules And Supreme
Court Mandate
Steven J. Greenwald*
A Lawyer who advertises or solicits . . is regarded by his brethren at
the bar as one with whom it is not pleasant to associate on the terms of
cordial intimacy characteristic of the relationship of Lawyers to one
another.'
INTRODUCTION
The American Bar Association (ABA), on January 3, 1980, circulated
a proposed draft for the complete revision of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct.' The proposal, now under consideration, contains a
section which would expand the permissible scope of attorney advertis-
ing and solicitation. This new tolerance is the result of a growing inter-
est in expanding public awareness to legal services.
The limitations upon advertising and solicitation have, in the past,
been intended to deter overreaching by unscrupulous lawyers. These
restrictions, however, have been limited by three recent United States
Supreme Court cases which have limited the scope of the ban on com-
mercial advertising: Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,' Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association," and In re Primus.5 According to these cases,
* General Counsel to F.C. Reiser Co.; B.A. Michigan State; J.D. Umv. of
Detroit.
1. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETmIcs 211 n.6 (1953).
2. This discussion draft, circulated by the ABA Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards, has not yet been officially adopted. The final version of the
Rules were scheduled for subnussion to the ABA's House of Delegates at its February,
1981 meeting.
3. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
4. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
5. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
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(1) commercial speech, which includes attorney advertising, is entitled
to first amendment protection; (2) a state may constitutionally regulate
potentially harmful in-person solicitation; and, (3) only upon a showing
of a compelling interes.t and requisite specificity may a state regulate
solicitation implicating political or associational freedoms. After ana-
lyzing these cases, this article will examine the ABA Proposed Model
Rules to determine whether the limitations it places upon attorney ad-
vertising and solicitation are constitutional in light of these recent
Supreme Court decisions.
Bates: THE SUPREME COURT PERMITS ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
In Bates v State Bar of Arizona,6 the Supreme Court considered
whether a newspaper advertisement which listed prices for routine legal
services fell within the confines of protected speech, or constituted a
form of commercial speech which remained outside the scope of first
amendment protection. J. Bates and Van O'Steen were attorneys li-
censed to practice in Arizona. They operated a legal clinic which pro-
vided standardized legal services for moderate fees. In an attempt to
attract clients for their clinic, they placed an advertisement in a news-
paper, offering routine legal services7 at reasonable rates. The state bar
considered the ad to be in violation of the Arizona Code of Professional
Responsibility, 8 and recommended a six-month suspension.9 The United
States Supreme Court, however, reversed, basing its decision on first
amendment issues which it had reserved in two earlier cases: Valentine
v Chrestensen10 and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council."1
In Chrestensen, the Supreme Court stated that although the Con-
6. 433 U.S. 350.
7 Routine legal services were deemed to include such matters as personal bank-
ruptcies, name changes, uncontested divorces, and uncontested adoptions. Id. at 354.
8. "[A] lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate as a
lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio and television announce-
ments or other means of commercial publicity. " ABA CANONS OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETHIcS, DR 2-101(B) (incorporated into Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of
Arizona).
9. The Arizona Supreme Court's final sanction was only a censure.
10. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
11. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
1 222
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stitution afforded protection to speech concerning social, political, and
economic ideas, the first amendment did not restrain government regu-
lation of purely commercial advertising. 2 This view continued until
1975, when the Court held in Bigelow v. Virginia s that the first
amendment guarantees of speech and press were applicable to a paid
commercial advertisement. The transition from its prior position in
Chrestensen was made complete one year later when the Court in Vir-
ginia Pharmacy held that commercial speech did indeed come within
the ambit of the first amendment.14 This case involved a challenge by a
consumer group to a statute which prohibited pharmacists from adver-
tising prices of prescription drugs, declaring such advertising to be un-
professional conduct of the type that could result in disciplinary ac-
tion.1 5 In support of the statute, the Virginia Board of Pharmacy
maintained that the ban on advertising was necessary to preserve the
professional character of the occupation. In addition, the Board specu-
lated that advertising would have such an adverse effect on prices as to
destroy some pharmacists' profit margin.16 Although these considera-
tions were viewed as adequate to justify regulation absent first amend-
ment protection, the Court found them to be unconvincing when bal-
anced against the need of the consumer for the information; especially
since the effect of the regulation would be to totally suppress informa-
tion concerning the prices of prescription drugs.
The majority opinion in Virginia Pharmacy was the first clear
indication that the interests of the listener (i.e., the consumer) could be
considered in deciding whether to extend protection to commercial
12. 316 U.S. at 54.
13. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The Court held as unconstitutional a Virginia statute
which made it a misdemeanor to encourage or prompt the procuring of an abortion
through the sale or circulation of any publication.
14. 425 U.S. at 761.
15. VA. CODE § 54-524.35 (1974) provides in part:
Any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who
(3) publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner what-
soever, any amount, price, fee, prermum, discount, rebate or credit term for pro-
fessional services or for drugs containing narcotics or for any drugs which may
be dispensed only by a prescription.
16. 425 U.S. at 766-68.
17. Id. at 770.
223 11 5:1981
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speech. The free flow of commercial information was seen as necessary
to aid consumers in making intelligent, well-informed economic
decisions.18
Relying upon the rationale advanced in Virginia Pharmacy, the
Court in Bates held that the justifications for prohibiting the advertis-
ing of "routine legal services" were insufficient to override the public
interest in maintaining the free flow of information.19 As the Court
stated in Griswold v. Connecticut,20 "[t]he right of freedom of speech
and press include not only the right to utter or print, but [also] . . the
right to receive, [and] the right to read. Without these peripheral
rights, the specific rights would be less secure."2 Proponents for the
continued restrictions upon attorney advertisement, however, argued
that the public would lose respect for the profession (as one geared to
the concerns of justice) if lawyers were allowed to advertise for
financial gain. Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court stated that
the relation between advertising and loss of professional respect was
quite tenuous since respect for a lawyer is determined to a great extent
by the individual lawyer's own competency.22
Also argued was the possibility that misrepresentation through ad-
vertisement would become so prevalent that a regulation short of an
outright ban would be impossible to enforce. The Court, however, felt
that most lawyers would behave as they always have:
they will abide by their solemn oaths to uphold the integrity and honor
of their profession and of the legal system and, of course, it will be
in the latter's interest, as in other cases of misconduct at the bar, to
assist in weeding out those who abuse their trust.23
Moreover, the Court determined that the states have in the past been
able to regulate the professions quite sufficiently.2 4
The Court, however, did not rule out all regulation of advertising,
18. Id. at 763.
19. 433 U.S. at 363.
20. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21. Id. at 482-83.
22. 433 U.S. at 369.
23. Id. at 381.
24. Id. at 384.
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stating that speech which is false, deceptive, or misleading is still sub-
ject to restraint.2 5 Even truthful statements may warrant restraint if
they have a potential to mislead the public; e.g., statements relating to
the "quality of services," which are often incapable of measurement or
verification. 6 This problem provided the genesis to another argument
in support of the ban: that the advertisement of legal services will inevi-
tably be misleading due to the consumer's inability "to determine in
advance just what services he needs."27 The Court, however, did not
believe that the present alternative (the prohibition of advertising) left
the client with any better information with which to select an attorney.
Instead the Court believed that the organized bar should educate the
public about legal services, especially the kind of "routine" services at
issue. The Court also felt that although laymen may not understand the
technicalities of a certain legal problem, they usually are aware of the
general nature of the service to be performed. As such, the advertise-
ment of an understandable schedule of services and their corresponding
prices could aid the consumer in making an initial decision to hire a
particular lawyer.28 A binding agreement as to price could then be
reached during the lawyer's initial consultation with the client.
The Court was also concerned with the ABA's estimate that "the
middle 70% of [the] population [was] not being reached or served ade-
quately by the legal profession."2' The Court noted that the reasons for
this underutilization included the fear of prohibitive costs and the in-
ability to locate a suitable lawyer.30 The Court maintained that the
disciplinary rule m question, DR 2-101(B),31 served to restrict the pub-
lic's access to legal services, especially for the "not-quite-poor and
25. Id. at 383.
26. Id. at 383-84.
27 Id. at 374.
28. Generally speaking, the public's failure to engage the legal professsion is due
to their misapprehension of the cost of legal services and their unawareness of "contin-
gency" payment possibilities. See Smith, Making the Availability of Legal Services
Better Known, 62 A.B.A. J. 855 (1976).
29. 433 U.S. at 376.
30. Id. See also Smith, Cannon 2: "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profes-
sion in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available," 48 TEx. L. REv 285
(1970).
31. See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETIcs, DR 2-101(B), supra note 8.
225 115:1981
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unknowledgeable. ' '3 2 The rule was seen as being in conflict with the
bar's ethical obligation to "facilitate the process of intelligent selection
of lawyers, and to assist in making legal services available."33 In ad-
dressing this issue, along with the first amendment issue of the con-
sumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, the Court
determined that the lawyer's professional duty to make counsel avail-
able outweighed the restriction imposed by DR 2-101(B), and that per-
mitting "restrained advertising" might well contribute to greater avail-
ability of legal services.'
This policy argument provided the basis for the Bates decision:
advertising could no longer be considered an unmitigated source of
harm to the administration of justice; rather, advertising might offer
great benefits. Even though advertising may increase the use of judicial
machinery, the notion that "it is always better for a person to suffer a
wrong silently than to redress it by legal action" could no longer be
accepted.3 5
Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court has indi-
cated what arguably is a mounting reluctance to protect commercial
speech. The 7 to 2 decision in Friedman v. Rogers"8 rejected a first
amendment attack on a Texas law prohibiting the practice of optome-
try under a trade name. The Court was convinced that the law was a
constitutionally permissible state regulation which protected the public
from deceptive and misleading use of optometrical trade names. The
Court insisted that a trade name is "a significantly different form of
commercial speech from that considered in Virginia Pharmacy and
Bates. Here we are concerned with a form of commercial speech
that has no intrinsic meaning. '37 Unlike the advertisements in those
cases, the advertisement of a trade name conveys no information about
prices, products, or services offered.38
32. 433 U.S. at 376-77.
33. ABA CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-1 (1976).
34. 433 U.S. at 376-77
35. Id. at 376.
36. 440 U.S. 1 (1978).
37 Id. at 12.
38. Id.
6
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Ohralik: ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION ARE
DISTINGUISHABLE
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Bates granted first
amendment protection to the commercial speech of attorneys, questions
still remained as to exactly what kind of speech could be afforded pro-
tection, and in what contexts. The Court in Bates held only that the
justifications advanced for prohibiting" truthful advertising of the avail-
ability and terms of "routine legal services" are insufficient to override
the public interest, protected by the first amendment, in maintaining
the free flow of information. 9 The Bates decision did not, and its au-
thors expressly declined to consider, the state's right to ban attorney
solicitation of clients.40 In spite of this silence, however, proponents of
solicitation have been encouraged by the Court's handling of the com-
mercial speech concept.41 In citing a line of cases including Virginia
Pharmacy and Chrestensen, the Court in Bates demonstrated that it
had never withdrawn protection from speech "merely because it pro-
posed a mundane commercial transaction. 42 Commentators have ar-
gued that the Court's analysis could apply to solicitation as well, in
that solicitation involves the same relation-of-interests between the
speaker and the consumer as direct advertising. 43
The distinction between advertising and solicitation has long been
a point of controversy. 44 However, although gray areas may occasion-
ally appear which will fit within both contexts, the characteristics of
the terms are distinguishable: advertising is a form of notice-giving or
information-giving, 45 while solicitation is the equivalent of asking or en-
ticing or making an urgent request.' 6 Solicitation clearly portends a
more aggressive and more direct form of communication than advertis-
ing. It is this aggressiveness and directness of contact on which the
fears of lawyer overreaching are based.
39. 433 U.S. at 384.
40. Id. at 366.
41. See Simet, Solicitation of Public and Private Litigation Under the First
Amendment, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 93.
42. 433 U.S. at 363-64.
43. Simet, supra note 41, at 104.
44. See Suchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REv 244 (1968).
45. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 31 (1971).
46. Id. at 2169.
227 1
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In Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Association7 the defendant
(Ohralik) argued that his solicitation was indistinguishable from the
advertising in Bates. Ohralik, an Ohio lawyer, personally approached
the victims of an automobile accident and succeeded in obtaining them
as clients for the prosecution of their claims arising out of the accident.
He even approached one of the victims while she was still in traction in
the hospital and offered to represent her. The Supreme Court consid-
ered the attorney's behavior to be a blatant example of "in-person so-
licitation," prohibited under the Code of Professional Responsibility 48
The Court pointed out that because the potential for abuse is
greater when a lawyer, a "professionally trained person in the art of
persuasion," is doing the selling, for purposes of constitutional analysis,
in-person solicitation will not be considered the equivalent of advertis-
ing. 49 As such, if information concerning a lawyer's availability (in-
cluding such items as telephone number, address, and office hours) was
to be disseminated to the general public or a large group of people, the
communication would be considered an allowable advertisement; how-
ever, an in-person communication suggesting the quality of a lawyer's
work and directed to one person or a small group of people goes beyond
the dissemination of general information and thus would be considered
an unallowable solicitation."0
47 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
48. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-104(B) provides in per-
tinent part: "A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should
obtain counsel or take legal actiot shall not accept employment resulting from that
advice " (Adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio.)
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103(A) provides: "A lawyer
shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or
associate, to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a
lawyer." (Adopted by theSbpreme Court of Ohio.) 436 U.S. at 453 n.9.
49. 436 U.S. at 465. .The Court noted that, unlike advertising, there is little
opportunity to publicly scrutinize in-person solicitation, because there are often no wit-
nesses other than the person being solicited. Id. at 466.
50. Id. See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103 and
DR 2-104.
8
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Primus: "BENIGN" SOLICITATION Is ALLOWED
In In re Primus,5 the companion case to Ohralik, the Supreme
Court considered whether any special dispensation should be given to
solicitation if done for purposes of political expression. Primus was a
lawyer affiliated with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).
The ACLU had been acknowledged by the Supreme Court to engage
in litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression and associa-
tion, as well as a means of communicating useful information to the
public. Primus presented a briefing to certain welfare recipients, in-
forming them of their legal rights with respect to a sterilization pro-
gram which was instituted as a condition to their continued receipt of
medical assistance. Subsequently, he mailed a letter to a woman who
had attended the briefing, informing her that free legal assistance was
available from the ACLU. The Disciplinary Board of the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court found the mailing of the letter constituted solicita-
tion, for which Primus was given a public reprimand. The United
States Supreme Court reversed, stating that "[w]here political expres-
sion or association is at issue, this Court has not tolerated the degree of
imprecision that often characterizes government regulation of the con-
duct of commercial affairs. 52
Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion, noted that, unlike the
situation in Ohralik, the solicitation in Primus "[was] presented in a
noncoercive, non-deceitful, and dignified manner to a potential client
who [was] emotionally and physically capable of making a rational de-
cision either to accept or reject the representation with respect to a
legal claim or matter that [was] not frivolous.15 3 Justice Marshall
called this kind of solicitation "benign" commercial solicitation and
contended that since there are significant benefits that can accrue to
society from benign solicitation, such activity should not be stifled with
a sweeping non-solicitation rule." In addition, he stated that when di-
rectly confronted with the question of the extent to which benign com-
mercial solicitation can constitutionally be restricted, the courts might
afford greater protection to such solicitation than would be allowed
51. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
52. Id. at 434.
53. Id. at 472 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 473.
229 1
15:1981
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under traditional court doctrine or the current ABA Disciplinary
Rules. 55 Thus, while a showing of potential abuse was sufficient to jus-
tify the disciplinary action taken in Ohralik, the Court required a
showing of actual harm, in light of the protection afforded by the first
amendment, to justify the disciplinary action taken in Primus.
These cases reflect the latest views of the Court on the propriety of
attorney solicitation. However, although the two cases may be helpful
in predicting the outcome of solicitation cases involving "ambulance-
chasing" or civil liberties activity, they offer little guidance in deter-
mining the outcome of cases which fall between these polar extremes.
In an effort to solve this problem, the ABA has indicated that it may
adopt a rule which would expand the permissible scope of attorney
solicitation.
ABA PROPOSED RULES ALLOWING ADVERTISING BY LAWYERS
In January, 1980, the American Bar Association Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards circulated a proposed draft for a
complete revision of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In this
proposal are several subsections which have a strong bearing on adver-
tising and solicitation. Proposed Rule 9 is designed to "assist the public
in obtaining legal services.""6 Specifically, Proposed Rule 9.2 is di-
rected to permitting public dissemination of information "that directs
attention to the need for legal services or which might assist in finding
a lawyer."'57 The rule would permit a lawyer to advertise services
through various public communications media, such as radio, news-
paper, television, direct mailing, and telephone directories.58 In addi-
tion, the advertisement may include lawyer's fees for specific services,
names of references, and, with their consent, names of regularly repre-
sented clients.5 The proposed rule is an attempt to codify the Bates
and Virginia Pharmacy mandates that the public be provided with
55. Id. at 477
56. See ABA PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 9,
Introduction (Discussion Draft 1980) [hereinafter referred to as PROPOSED MODEL
RULES].
57 See PROPOSED MODEL RULE 9.2, Comment.
58. Id. 9.2(a).
59. Id. 9.2, Comment.
10
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complete information on the availability, nature, and prices of products
and services.60
"The First Amendment, . . . [however], does not prohibit the
State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow
cleanly as well as freely." 1 Since the adoption of the first Canons of
Professional Ethics, the ABA has been concerned with the possibility
that unscrupulous lawyers could mislead the public through inflated
claims of legal skills. 2 Following the recognition in Virginia Pharmacy
that freedom of speech is not an unlimited license to talk," all attorney
advertisements allowed under Proposed Rule 9.2 will be subject to the
requirements of Proposed Rule 9.1, which makes clear that misleading
or untruthful speech will not be allowed.6" These limitations are well
within that allowed by the Supreme Court, which has recognized that
the content of a communication may affect the measure of protection
afforded to the speech.6 5 As the Court pointed out in Virginia Phar-
macy, "[s]ome forms of commercial speech regulation are surely per-
missible. . . Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never
been protected for its own sake." 6
60. In Bates, Justice Blackmun, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated:
"[t]he only services that lend themselves to advertising are the routine ones: the uncon-
tested divorce, the simple adoption, [and] the uncontested personal bankruptcy. "
433 U.S. at 372.
.61. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72.
62. See DRINKER, supra note 1, at 112.
63. 425 U.S. 748. See also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 336 U.S. 36, 50
(1960).
64. PROPOSED MODEL RULE 9.1 provides:
A lawyer shall not make any false, fraudulent, or misleading statement about the
lawyer or the lawyer's services to a client or prospective client. A statement is
false, fraudulent or misleading if it:
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact
necessary to make the statement as a whole not misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation, or states or implies that
the lawyer can achieve restilts by legally improper means; or
(c) compares the quality of the lawyer's services with that of other law-
yers' services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated.
65. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976).
66. 425 U.S. at 770-71.
2311
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ABA PROPOSED RULES ALLOWING SOLICITATION
As noted above, the Court in Primus held that the solicitation of
prospective litigants by nonprofit organizations which engage in litiga-
tion as a form of political expression and political association is entitled
to first amendment protection. In response to this mandate, the ABA
has included within its proposal Rule 9.3(b)(3), which permits a lawyer
to initiate contact with a prospective client if "under the auspices of a
public or charitable legal services organization or a bonafide political,
social, civic, fraternal, employee, or trade organization whose purposes
include but are not limited to providing or recommending legal ser-
vices."6 7 Clearly this rule goes beyond what was called for in Primus,
for not only would the provision encompass those organizations who
engage in litigation as a vehicle for political expression and association,
such as the ACLU and the NAACP, but would also extend to a host of
other organizations whose purposes are not limited to providing or rec-
ommending legal services (e.g., labor unions, college or professional
fraternities, and religious organizations). The proposed rule, however,
does not specify exactly what relationship the attorney must have to the
organization or define under the auspices. It invites much abuse by
lawyers whose sole purpose in associating with such an "approved" or-
ganization is to find a loophole in the rule against in-person solicitation.
There are, however, certain limitations placed upon allowable
forms of solicitation. Since the common law originally banned solicita-
tion proponents for the continued ban have asserted that solicitation
may harm the client by hindering his free choice in the selection of a
lawyer.6 8 Recognizing these concerns, the Court in Primus took great
care in pointing out that the solicitation in that case was allowed to go
undisciplined only because there was no overreaching, misrepresenta-
tion, coercion, duress, or harassment involved.69 In light of these con-
siderations, Proposed Model Rule 9.3(a) provides that:
A lawyer shall not initiate contact with a prospective client if: (1) The
lawyer reasonably should know that the physical, emotional, or mental
state of the person solicited is such that the person solicited could not
67 PROPOSED MODEL RULE 9.3(b)(3).
68. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 210-12.
69. 436 U.S. at 434-37.
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exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer; (2) the person
solicited has made known a desire not to receive communications from
the lawyer; or (3) the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or harass-
ment."
Although these provisions will work to bar those forms of solicita-
tion characteristic of harassment, undue influence, and "ambulance
chasing," they by no means speak to all of the problems. Advocates for
the continued ban on solicitation maintain that the restrictions are nec-
essary in order to avoid the stirring up of litigation.71 Although Pro-
posed Rule 9.3 does not address this issue, there are other provisions
within the Proposed Model Rules which will provide a sufficient hedge
against such improper behavior. 2 In any event, however, the United
States Supreme Court has indicated that the interest in preventing the
"stirring up" of frivolous or vexatious litigation no longer offers a rea-
sonable justification for the discipline administered to the lawyer who
solicits. 73
ABA MODEL RULES AND RECENT STATE CASES ON SOLICITA-
TION BY MAIL
The ABA Proposed Model Rules also address the issue of whether
and in what situations an attorney may solicit clients by mail. Specifi-
cally, Proposed Rule 9.3(b)(2) states that a lawyer may initiate contact
with a prospective client "by a letter concerning a specific event or
transaction if the letter is followed up only upon positive response by
the addressee. '7 4 The rule clearly extends the scope of protection af-
forded by Primus since it does not require the solicitation to be under
the auspices of a non-profit "political" organization. In addition, the
70. PROPOSED MODEL RULE 9.3(a).
71. The common law referred to this type of behavior as "barratry." See Note,
Advertising, Solicitation, and Prepaid Legal Services, 40 TENN. L. REV 439, 451
(1973).
72. See, e.g., PROPOSED MODEL RULE 3.2 (mandating a spirit of fairness in deal-
ing with opposing party and counsel), PROPOSED MODEL RULE 2.3 (proscribing the
giving of advice to a client concerning wrongful conduct), and PROPOSED MODEL RULE
3.1 (mandating a high degree of candor in the lawyer's representations to a tribunal).
73. See 436 U.S. at 436-37.
74. PROPOSED MODEL RULE 9.3(b)(2).
2331
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letter may even concern a specific event, such as a traffic accident; and
the purpose of any resulting litigation would not have to amount to a
form of "political expression," as was required in Primus. However,
although Primus involved a solicitation by mail, the Court did not spe-
cifically address this issue, as the case was decided on the basis of first
amendment rights of association and political expression. The issue has
been addressed, however, in several post-Primus state court decisions.
In Kentucky Bar Association v. Stuart,75 the Kentucky Supreme
Court cited Bates, Ohralik, and Primus in holding that a law firm's
letter to real estate agencies describing the firm's qualifications, ser-
vices, and process for title searches and deed and mortgage prepara-
tions did not constitute a violation of the Kentucky State Bar Associa-
tion's rule prohibiting "in-person solicitation,' 7 but rather fell within
the confines of constitutionally protected advertisements. 7 In dis-
missing the complaint, the court stated that the letters did not pose the
threats of any of the noted evils of solicitation since there was no pres-
sure or demand which would encourage a person to make a hasty, unin-
formed decision.78 The court pointed out that the potential for decep-
tion exists in all forms of advertising, not just letters, and the fact that
this case was prosecuted demonstrated that the enforcement of ethical
standards would not be impossible. 79 This was the rationale used to
codify Proposed Model Rule 9.3(b)(2). The reasoning stems from the
fact that solicitation by mail appears reasonably subject to control and
therefore can be made almost completely free of the potential for over-
reaching of in-person solicitation.
It should be noted that the letters sent in Stuart were of a "gener-
alized" nature, i.e., the letters were not directed to potential clients
with an identified present need for legal services. As mailings become
more specifically drafted and provide more of a quasi-personal link,
however, courts have been less tolerant of them as a form of solicita-
tion. Letters which are directed to targeted potential clients concerning
"specific events or transactions" have been held to constitute improper
75. 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978).
76. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103(A), supra note
48 (adopted by the Supreme Court of Kentucky).
77 568 S.W.2d at 934.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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solicitation.80
Although such letters would be allowed under Proposed Rule
9.3(b)(2), it is not clear whether the states would be quick to adopt its
provisions. In Allison v. Louisiana State Bar Association,81 the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court reached a holding that was directly antithetical to
the ABA proposed codification. In that case, a group of attorneys had
mailed to certain employers a letter describing services offered as part
of a prepaid employees' "legal plan" which the attorneys were attempt-
ing to market. Although there was no direct solicitation to the employ-
ees, the court found that there was a "private" solicitation (by letter)
to the employer to engage in a specific transaction.82 Considering the
difficulties in regulating the potential for abuse, the court denied the
injunctive relief requested by the attorneys that would have prevented
the Louisiana State Bar Association from enforcing its disciplinary
rule.83 In addition, the court held that the state's prohibition against
direct solicitation of this kind had no adverse impact upon the attor-
ney's first amendment rights.'
The Allison and Stuart cases, however, are distinguishable The
letters in Allison were not of a "generalized" nature as they were in
Stuart; rather, the letters were directed to potential clients with an
identified present need for legal services. In addition, the offer in the
Allison letter was privately made and not in the public domain for all
to receive, as in Bates (newspaper ad) and Stuart (real estate
agencies).
New York has also indicated its reluctance to expand the permissi-
ble scope of solicitation by mail beyond that of a "generalized" letter.
In re Koffler85 concerned a group of attorneys who mailed approxi-
mately eight thousand letters to homeowners and real estate brokers.
80. See, e.g., In re Lee, 242 Or. 302, 409 P.2d 337 (1965) (holding as improper
a solicitation by letter to represent an accident victim); Bayton Bar Ass'n v. Herzog,
173 Ohio St. 313, 181 N.E.2d 880 (1962) (holding as improper the solicitation by mail
of individuals who had filed claims for workmen's compensation benefits).
81. 362 So. 2d 489 (La. 1978).
82. Id. at 496.
83. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103 (adopted by the
Supreme Court of Louisiana).
84. 362 So. 2d at 496.
85. 70 A.D.2d 252, 420 N.Y.S.2d 560 (App. Div. 1979).
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The court stated that it was concerned not because the mail had been
used to contact certain interested individuals, but because the "con-
tent" of the letters indicated a seeking out of those people interested in
a transaction. The court believed that if such letters are sent, there
should not be a statement in the letter asking to establish a "personal
and private relationship . ..peculiarly geared to a particular legal
transaction. '8 6 As the court pointed out, "[a] member of the Bar must
never forget that he is a lawyer first and only then, if proper, an
entrepreneur "7
COMPARISON: RECENT STATE RULES ALLOWING SOLICITATION
Not all states have been as conservative in their approach toward
solicitation as have Louisiana and New York. Since Primus, several
jurisdictions have attempted to codify extremely liberal and controver-
sial rules toward solicitation. 8 The most dramatic revision has been the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals' amendment to its Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. Under these newly enacted provisions, solicita-
tion will be prohibited only if it involves the use of "false, fraudulent or
deceptive claims, if it involves the use of undue influence or if the po-
tential client is apparently in a physical or mental condition that would
make it unlikely that he or she could exercise a reasonable, considered
judgment as to the selection of a lawyer."89 These limitations are quite
similar to the ABA Proposed Model Rules' limitation on solicitation.
The D.C. rules, however, do not require the lawyer to be "under the
auspices" of a public, charitable, or legal services organization, that his
solicitation be by letter, or that the lawyer not solicit those who make
known a desire not to be solicited.90 This "right to be let alone" was
considered by the United States Supreme Court in Rowan v Post Of-
86. Id. at _, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
87 Id. at _, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
88. See Welch, Bates, Ohralik, Primus-The First Amendment Challenge to
State Regulation of Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, 30 BAYLOR L. REv 585
(1978).
89. D.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103(A). (Complete text
of D.C. Code of Professional Responsibility is reprinted in Welch, supra note 88, at
609.)
90. This requirement is included in PROPOSED MODEL RULE 9.3(a)(2), infra
note 95.
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fice Department.1 In that case, a group of direct mail advertisers chal-
lenged a federal statute92 under which an individual could restrain a
particular sender from mailing advertisements to his home if he found
such mailings to be offensive. In upholding the statute the Court held
that a householder has the right to determine what material enters the
zone of privacy surrounding his home and refused to allow any greater
protection for material consigned to the mail.93 To do so would be to
permit a form of trespass, a result found to be untenable since the Con-
stitution guarantees only the right to speak, not the right to force
others to listen.9 '
The D.C. Rule's disregard for the solicited person's right "to be let
alone" would permit offensive behavior on the part of some lawyers.
For example, in situations where the need for legal services is readily
identifiable (e.g., where there has been an automobile accident or a
death in the family), the race to be the first lawyer on the scene may be
most offensive to the victim or his family. By including limitations,
such as rules 9.3(a)(2) and 9.3(a)(3) against forced solicitation, the
ABA's proposed rules seek to avoid these kinds of problems.95
91. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
92. 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (1970).
93. 397 U.S. at 736.
94. Id.
95. PROPOSED MODEL RULE 9.3 reads in its entirety:
(a) A lawyer shall not initiate contact with a prospective client if:
*(1) the lawyer reasonably should know that the physical, emotional, or
mental state of the person solicited is such that the person could not exer-
cise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer;
(2) the person solicited has made known a desire not to receive communi-
cations from the lawyer; or
(3) the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or harrassment.
(b) Subject to the requirements of paragraph (a), a lawyer may initiate contact
with a prospective client in the following circumstances:
(1) if the prospective client is a close friend or relative of the lawyer;
(2) by a letter concerning a specific event or transaction if the letter is
followed up only upon positive response by the addressee; or
(3) [under the auspices] of a public or charitable legal services organiza-
tion or a bona fide political, social, civic, fraternal, employee, or trade
organization whose purposes include but are not limited to providing or
recommending legal service.
(c) A lawyer shall not give another person anything of value to initiate contact
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The District of Columbia, however, is not alone in its liberal ap-
proach toward attorney solicitation. In 1978, the Board of Governors of
the California State Bar tentatively approved a change in its Rules of
Professional Conduct to permit in-person solicitation. The twelve to six
vote tentatively adopted a rule change very similar to that of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Once finally approved, California lawyers may seek
out clients and offer to represent them in specific cases unless
the statements the lawyer makes are false, misleading or tend to confuse
the client; the potential client is in such a physical, mental or emotional
state that he or she would not be expected to exercise reasonable judg-
ment in hiring a lawyer; or the lawyer's approach to the client involves
any kind of intrusion, coercion or harassment.98
With this last provision, the California rule is very similar to the ABA
proposed rule. It is noteworthy that this influential jurisdiction has gone
as far as it has toward adopting a rule which is no less radical than the
ABA's proposed rule.97
The ABA rules would prove a better guide than the District of
Columbia or California rules in determining the legality of solicitations
falling between these two poles, but all three attempts can be seen as
providing some assistance. All three require that the solicitation be
truthful and presented in a noncoercive, nondeceitful manner to a po-
tential client who is emotionally and physically capable of making a
rational decision either to accept or reject the representation. In the
average case where honest unpressured commercial solicitation is in-
volved, i.e., in a situation not presented in either Primus or Ohralik,
these three attempts will serve their States' interests in protecting the
public, while avoiding those sweeping nonsolicitation rules which only
prevent the free flow of information.
with a prospective client on behalf of the lawyer.
96. St. B. of Cal. Rep., Aug. 1978, at 1.
97 One lawyer-member of the California Board of Governors, who voted for the
proposal, commented: "[i]t is about time we give the little guy a chance to hustle and
get a little business." Id. at 6-7
1238 Nova Law Journal
5:19811
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INDICATION OF SPECIALIZATION IN ADVERTISEMENT
SOLICITATION
Although the current ABA Disciplinary Rules prohibit a lawyer
from holding himself out as limiting his practice to specified areas of
law, the ABA has recently adopted the position that indications of spe-
cialization are useful in assisting the pubic in obtaining information
about legal services 8 and are deserving of first amendment protec-
tion.99 According to Proposed Rule 9.4(b), a lawyer whose practice is
limited to a specified area of law may communicate that fact in accor-
dance with the provisions on designation of the particular state.
Seven states currently have specialization programs which permit
the lawyer to be "certified" or "designated" in more than one field of
law if he meets the established standards. 100 Florida's "designation"
program is the current proposed model for most other states.101 It re-
quires, among other things, the designation of certain board-approved
areas of specialty, a minimum of three years practice of law, and sub-
stantial experience in the designated specialty area. In addition, no
more than three areas of specialty can be designated, and renewal of
the right to designate is required every three years.
The "certification" programs alluded to in ABA Proposed Rule
9.4 have their genesis in the pilot programs adopted in Texas, Califor-
nia and Arizona. 2 These programs are limited to only a few areas of
law and require recertification, peer ratings, continuing education, spe-
cific practice time requirements in the area of specialty, and most im-
portantly, an examination. "Certification" plans obviously involve a
more demanding procedure for recognition of specialization than do
"designation" plans. This is due to the obvious fact that the states have
a different definition of, and different standards fbr, specialization. This
is the reason why Rule 9.4(b) of the ABA Proposed Model Rules re-
98. See ABA COMM. ON ADVERTISING AND SPECIALIZATION DISCUSSION DRAFT,
35 Bus. LAW. 303 (1979).
99. ABA COMM. ON SPECIALIZATION, INFORMATION BULL. No. 4 at 8 (Report
to the House of Delegates Feb. 1978).
100. Id. The states are Florida, Iowa, New Mexico, Connecticut, Arizona, Cali-
fornia, and Texas.
101. FLA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-105.
102. Implemented in 1971, 1975, and 1976 respectively. See Committee Notes,
supra note 99.
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quire the particular state to insert its own provisions of specialization,
and therein lies its greatest fault, i.e., the failure to provide uniform
standards for attorney specialization programs. 10 3 The ABA should
have included within its proposal some form of compromise specializa-
tion plan or choice of plans which would involve elements of both "cer-
tification" and "designation." The states, of course, would not be bound
to adopt this ABA Model Rule, but at least the states would have some
national guide as to how to model their own rules. This is, after all, the
purpose of the Model Rules. By leaving Rule 9 4(b) in its present form,
however, the ABA will be inviting much confusion as states choose be-
tween countless variations of the Florida and California plans.
CONCLUSION: THE STATES ARE FREE To CHOOSE
In response to the recent Supreme Court decisions of Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council and
Bates v State Bar of Arizona, granting commercial speech (which in-
cludes attorney advertising) first amendment protection, the ABA has
proposed a complete revision of their Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct. The Proposed Rules are extremely liberal with respect to their
applicability to attorney advertising, more than satisfying the mandate
in Bates that information which brings the public's attention to the
need for legal services flow freely. The limitations in the Proposed
Rules facilitate this mandate by proscribing only those advertisements
which contain misrepresentations or unjustified statements concerning
the quality of a lawyer or his services.
The Proposed Rules, however, are more restrictive in their regula-
tion of attorney solicitation. This is due to the greater potential for
abuse in permitting a lawyer, a professional trained in the art of per-
suasion, to initiate in-person contact with a prospective client. The con-
stitutionality of this position is well established, considering the Su-
preme Court's recognition in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association
that for purposes of constitutional analysis, in-person solicitation in not
equivalent to advertising, and that the State may regulate in-person
103. Even proponents of bar-operated specialization plans recommend the
establishment of uniform national and regional education programs to assist the public
in interpreting these designations. See ABA COMM. ON SPECIALIZATION, INFORMATION
BULL. No. 5 (Sept. 1978).
1 240 Nova Law Journal 5:1981 1
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solicitation for pecuniary gain under those circumstances likely to re-
sult in adverse consequences. 10 '
However, the Proposed Rules are still quite liberal in their ap-
proach, going beyond the Supreme Court's mandate in In re Primus,
allowing solicitation as a means of political expression, by permitting
an attorney to solicit if done "under the auspices" of a bar-approved
organization, and not limiting the organization or the attorney to a
strictly non-profit motive. In addition, the Proposed Model Rules would
permit an attorney to solicit by mail even though not done under the
auspices of a bar-approved organization. Although several states have
indicated a willingness to permit solicitations of this nature, most have
required that the content of the solicitation be of a generalized nature
and not restricted to a specific event or circumstance.
It appears, nonetheless, that the ABA Proposed Model Rules will
be considered, in large part, acceptable to many states. Two influential
jurisdictions, California and the District of Columbia, have recently
adopted solicitation rules which are even more liberal than the Pro-
posed Model Rules. This trend will, in all probability, continue until a
more sensible code is adopted which will permit more liberated forms
of advertising. That code will in all likelihood have a form quite similar
to the ABA Proposed Model Rules.
104. 436 U.S. at 462.
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